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Abstract
In most of the countries in transition from a planned to a market economy (Former Soviet Union
(FSU) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)) patients are routinely asked to pay unofficially for
the medicines and other supplies that ought to be free. They are often described as “payments to
individuals or institutions in cash or in kind made outside official payment channels for services
that are meant to be covered by the public health care system”. Despite their illegality, surveys
undertaken in Bulgaria, Poland, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan found that 43%, 46%, 50%, and 70%
of the patients paid for officially free services.
We consider a simple model of discriminatory pricing and service differentiation in which
state salaried physicians employed in a monopoly state acute hospital adjust the quality of care to
the level of unofficial payment paid by the patient. On one hand, low motivated and poorly paid
physicians exploit their monopoly position by choosing the payment / quality combination to be
provided with the knowledge that corruption is largely ignored. There is a cost involved in the
provision of each type of treatment (e.g. the potential fine imposed if found). On the other hand, the
general quality of the health care provided by the sate is perceived to be poor and some patients are
willing to pay unofficially in an attempt to improve the quality of care in some way. Patients have
heterogeneous preferences for care quality. Physicians exploit their position as providers and the
demand for quality, and offer differing levels of care quality to paying and non-paying patients.
This behavioural model is then tested using a unique dataset obtained from a survey of 1508
discharged hospital surgical and trauma patients treated in three hospitals in Almaty City,
Kazakhstan in 1999. Data include information on patients’ experience in hospital including where
and how much was paid unofficially and patients’ socio-economic characteristics. Each patient is
identified by an ICD10 code and most surgical and trauma conditions for which entitlement is free
are represented. We use waiting time for admissions and hospital length of stay (LOS) as
observable measures of quality. Process indicators, such as “time” have traditionally been used to
monitor hospital performance. Waiting is used as a quality proxy in studies of health service
demand and surveys suggest that patients pay to reduce the wait. LOS is taken as a measure of
quality in that it is determined by physicians and may proxy not only more attention paid to the
patient by the doctor but also fewer post-surgical complications in a context where post-hospital
follow up is very limited. We then compare these results with those using a categorically (ordered)
variable reflecting the subjective view of the patients towards the health care quality received.
We use both OLS analysis and, in the case of the categorical variable, ordered probit models
to test whether, as suggested by the theory, surveys and anedoctal reports, patients are paying for
increased treatment quality. We account for heteroskedasticity, potential endogeneity, and test the
general model specification. We look at both pooled and unpooled hospital data. We find that:
patients are paying to decrease the time for surgical admissions; patients are paying to stay longer in
hospital (or more realistically not to discharged early); there is some patient heterogeneity. These
results conform to the theoretical modelling and the anedoctal reports suggesting that patients are
paying for quality and physicians are exploiting their monopoly power to charge informal
payments, which result in an increase in their incomes.
This paper contributes to the literature in various ways: a) as one of the first attempts to use
economic theory to model unofficial payments and related physician behaviour; b) we use original
data from Kazakhstan to conduct econometric analysis so as to explore whether prior payment
influences the quality of care received (measured using process indicators) while previous studies
were limited to answer the who, how much, when and to whom; c) the unofficial pricing behaviour
of state salaried physicians in a public sector hospital may offer insights into the general behaviour
of physicians.
Keywords: transition economies, unofficial or informal payments for health care, length of
stay, ordered probit and marginal effects
JEL: I1, P33
1. Introduction
In many emerging market economies of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) patients are routinely asked and expected to unofficially pay for medicines and
medical supplies required for their medical treatment (World Bank, 2000a).  These payments have
been described as “payments to individuals or institutions in cash or in kind made outside official
payment channels for services that are meant to be covered (without direct charge) by the public
health care system”(Lewis, 2000).  Their legality is either not clear or they are illegal.  Recent
surveys of patients undertaken in Bulgaria, Poland, and Turkmenistan found that 43%, 46%, and
50% respectively paid for services that were officially free (Delcheva et al., 1997; Ladbury, 1997;
Chawla et al., 1998).  In Tajikistan, 70% of survey respondents stated they expected to have to pay
for health care (Mirzoev, 1999).  Thompson and Witter (2000) and Ensor (2000) present typologies
of these payments.
Unofficial payments are rooted in systems of bargaining and connections inherited from the
socialist system (Smith, 1973).  The planned and rigid nature of health care provision led patients to
search for mechanisms to obtain faster and better services (e.g. more doctor’s attention) than those
they would obtain as the basic state services, (Gaal, 1999a,b; Kornai, 2000).  These payments
increased the financial reward to the medical activity, highly demanding but little recognised.
The widespread existence of unofficial payments for health care is also closely related to the
impact of economic restructuring including the closure of state and private enterprises and increased
unemployment, which resulted in a decline in tax revenue and subsequent reductions in government
health sector funding.  Government failure in addressing the scope and scale of service provision
(downsizing services and reducing staff), as a result of resource constraints, has led to a gap in state
resources necessary to fund the existing level of provision.  Chronic shortages, coupled with
inadequate equipment resulted in patients or their relatives being routinely asked to cover the
shortfall in health care funding by paying, through unofficial channels, for medicines and other
supplies required for their medical treatment, which are scarce due to tighter budget constraints.
Unofficial payments feature in countries where health workers salaries are low relative to
other state and private sector professions, delays are commonplace - in Lithuania and Ukraine,
workers were waiting up to three months to be paid, with reports of longer delays in Russia (Healy
and McKee, 1998), and the private sector - which could provide extra income - is practically non-
existent.  The majority of unofficial payments go to physicians: e.g. in Poland 81% of payments
were paid to physicians, with the rest being paid to other health workers (Chawla et al., 1998).  In
Estonia, 60% of physicians reported receiving at least one non-cash gift each week and some4
received a monetary tip (Barr, 1996).  This monetary tip constituted an average amount of around
18.5% of their monthly salary.  Unofficial payments double the average gross salary of physicians
in Poland (Chawla et al., 1998) and are five times the salary of Albanian specialist doctors (Healy
and McKee, 1998), while in Hungary they constitute 62% of the net income of physicians (Kornai,
2000).  In the Czech Republic over 27% of patients gave gifts to obtain better treatment and 7%
paid out of fear of receiving no treatment (Masopust, 1989).  The presence of widespread
corruption, weak monitoring, and minimal sanctions, and their enforcement, for those who are
caught taking such payments, fuels unofficial payments.  Lack of information and non-reporting by
patients and physicians’ lack of accountability to a higher authority help to maintain the system.
More generally, unofficial payments can be viewed as an attempt to improve service quality
receive in chronically underfunded state facilities (Thompson and Witter, 2000; Lewis et al., 2001).
These improvements are wide-ranging and may include, for example, more effective medicines than
those offered without charge by the state, minimally invasive surgical technologies rather than
conventional surgery, or simply more “effort” undertaken by the physician.  Anecdotal reports
suggest that motivating physician “effort” is one of the key reasons for payment (Thompson and
Witter, 2000).  Field (1998) suggests that unofficial payments “constitute a countervailing power at
the disposal of the patient to exert some kind of control over the physician”.  Lewis et al. (2001)
find that patients paid to save time and Gaal (1999b) argues that payments are made so as to change
providers’ attitude towards the patient and adapt treatment to patient’s convenience.  For Kornai
(2000) these payments are a “bribe” paid by patients to doctors to ensure extra-attention, “jump” the
queue thus obtaining a shorter period of waiting, obtain a better bed or a chosen doctor.
Unofficial payments are likely to be inequitable because patients’ access to services or
quality of care depends on their ability to pay.  In Bulgaria payments made to health workers
represented 3 to 14% of a patient’s average monthly income with the cost of a surgical procedure
around 83% of the average income (Delcheva et al., 1997).  Bognar et al. (2000) found that
payments were income independent.  Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that, in Kazakhstan, relatives
of patients often advertise in newspapers for monetary support and that the Russia Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey finds “lack of money” as the main reason for the inability to obtain medicines
cited twice as often in 1996 as in 1994 (Liu et al., 1998).  Some people may be delaying care and
avoiding the health sector all together (Lewis, 2001).  Unofficial payments may also undermine
investment in equipment and facilities because they are channelled to individuals not to the system.
However, these payments play an important role in sustaining health care systems in many
countries where, despite government efforts, public revenues generated officially have been limited
(World Bank, 2000b).  They represent a significant slice of the total health care expenditure and a5
financial supplement for health workers whose wages were kept low before and after transition
started (Kornai, 2000).  In Kazakhstan, in 1996, they constituted 25-30% of the state budget
considering medicines alone and patients may pay around US$50 for inpatient medicines (Ensor
and Savelyeva, 1998; Thompson and Witter, 2000).  The purchasing of drugs is indeed a common
source of unofficial expenditure although inpatient care is the most costly item (Lewis, 2001).
Much of the unofficial payments literature has focused on differing types of unofficial
payment and the contribution these payments make to total health care spending (e.g. Thompson
and Witter, 2000; Lewis, 2001).  According to Lewis (2001), “a greater understanding is important
if abuse of the system is to be addressed and resolved”.
We therefore develop and test an economic model of physician behaviour in which state
salaried physicians adjust the quality of care to the level of unofficial payment paid by the patient in
a monopoly state acute hospital setting, offering differing levels of service quality to paying and
non-paying patients.  The model is motivated by the perception that the general quality of state
health care provision is poor and some patients are willing to pay unofficially in an attempt to
improve care quality.  Demand is the result of patients’ perceptions of quality and associated
preferences for the low and basic quality services, and the prices charged.  On the supply side
poorly paid and demotivated physicians exploit their monopoly position and better information
concerning care by engaging in discriminatory pricing and service differentiation, doing so with the
knowledge that corruption is largely ignored by the state.  The physician chooses the payments to
charge for the low and the high quality services given the patients’ demands (i.e. the physician
chooses the quality - payment combination).  The theory is then tested using data from a survey of
1508 discharged acute hospital (surgery and trauma) patients in Kazakhstan.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in various ways.  Firstly, it is one of the first
attempts to use both economic theory and econometric tools to analyse the issue of unofficial
payments and explore whether prior payment influences the quality of care received (measured
using process and subjective indicators of quality).  While previous studies were limited to answer
the “whom, how much, when and to whom” of the matter and tend to provide anecdotal reports of
physician behaviour with estimates of spending collected through primary surveys, we use a
discriminatory price differentiated service model to formalise the unofficial market for quality of
care and both ordinary least squares and ordered probit analysis to test it.  There are few, if any
published English language studies, which formally attempt to model and test physician behaviour
within an unofficial payments context despite the number of anecdotal reports suggesting that
physicians may indeed be exploiting their monopoly position engaging in discriminatory unofficial
pricing and service differentiation.  Secondly, we use detailed data on discharged acute hospital6
patients that in general are very difficult to obtain.  The data are gathered for patients who had an
intervention that was officially free of charge, fact that allow us to identify clearly the amount paid
unofficially.  Some of the previous studies did/could not distinguish between official and unofficial
payments for care thus providing only a rough idea of what the latter might be.  Finally, the
unofficial pricing behaviour of state salaried physicians working in the hospital sector might offer
some insights into the behaviour of physicians working in formal health care systems elsewhere.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the Kazak health care system.
Section 3 develops a model of physician and patients’ behaviour in a context of an unofficial market
for health care quality.  Section 4 describes the data and methods used to test the model.  Section 5
presents the results of OLS regressions.  Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.
2. The health care system in Kazakhstan
Before independence, the Ministry of Health in Kazakhstan administered policy made in Moscow
through a centrally organised hierarchical structure, from the republic level to the oblast or city
administrations, then to the subordinate rayon level.  The Kazak health care system featured most of
the usual characteristics of a Soviet health care system (see Ryan, 1978 for a detailed description of
the organisation of Soviet health care): services were, in principle, accessible and mostly free to
everyone; funding was based on capacity rather than activity; over emphasis was given to specialist
training and there was a dependence on hospitalisation, with long lengths of stay; and incentives
focused on penalties for failure rather than incentives for success (Ensor and Rittmann, 1997).  The
weaknesses of the Soviet health care system have been well documented (European Observatory,
1999).  Since independence they have been exacerbated by declining health sector spending, a
product of deep economic recession.  National income halved between 1991 and 1995, while
government revenue fell by more than 70% (World Bank, 1997).  The acute funding crisis and over-
emphasis on inpatient care resulted in resources being extremely thinly spread.
Kazakhstan began the 1990s with a government funded, tax-based, health care system.  A
mandatory health insurance system was established in 1996 and dissolved in 1998, largely due to
enterprises being unable to pay contributions to the fund, a large informal workforce, inability of
the regional administrations to cover the socially protected population, particularly the growing
unemployed, and a collapse in the confidence in the fund with allegations of corruption and
misappropriation of reserve funds.  Health care now comes from two main sources (similar position
to pre-insurance funding): the government budget and out-of-pocket payments (official and
unofficial).  A 1994 survey of 5000 households in South Kazakhstan found that informal payments
were common for both outpatient and inpatient care.  On an inpatient basis, the subject of this7
paper, payment was made to providers 11% of the time and 12% to surgeons.  In addition, 25-42%
of those hospitalised provided their own bedding, clean laundry and food, and 57% provided their
own medicines (Sari et al., 2000).  A decree formalising user charges was introduced in 1999
(European Observatory, 1999).  The ability of a significant proportion of the population to pay for
health care is limited; a living standards survey undertaken in 1996 found that over a third of the
population lived below a “subsistence minimum” living standard (World Bank, 1998).
Whilst entitlement to comprehensive health care was a feature of the pre-independence
system, in recent years entitlement benefits have become confusing.  This has partly been the result
of the insurance experiment where services were separated into two “packages”: basic (provided by
insurance) and guaranteed (paid for by the state).  Confusion is enhanced by shortages relating to
chronic underfunding and health sector corruption.  In principle primary health care consultations
are free, although medicines are not free for the non-exempt.  Yet, even the exemption system does
not function well and many individuals have to pay for medicines that should be free.  Hospital
benefit entitlement is particularly confusing and whether a patient pays depends on whether an
illness is acute/not acute, resource availability, and health worker corruption.  For example,
individuals requiring elective surgery are increasingly required to pay whereas those who are
admitted as acute/emergency patients are, again in principle, exempt from payment.  However, as
the empirical results in this paper show, in reality the vast majority of patients pay for hospital care.
The health care system is dominated by hospital care and the number of days a patient
spends in hospital appears to be quite important.  In countries like the UK post-hospital follow-up
care is increasingly important as the length of hospital stay is reduced.  In Kazakhstan, however,
post-hospital follow-up care is weak and anecdotal reports suggest that patients are willing to pay to
stay in hospital for reassurance, as once they leave hospital follow-up care is non-existent.
3. Physician and patient’s behaviour: an unofficial health care market
In this section we model patients’ and physicians’ behaviour looking at the parallel and unofficial
market for health care within a monopoly state provider.  Given the apathetic attitude of
government towards corruption in some of the countries of the FSU and CEE, state salaried
physicians might well adopt patterns of market behaviour within state hospitals and explore an
element of monopoly power thus creating an unofficial market for health care.
On one side of this market we have the patients for whom the general quality of state health
care provision is perceived to be poor.  Consequently, some patients are willing to pay unofficially
for services (e.g. medicines, surgeon’s time) that are free so as to improve the quality of care
received.  Patients have different preferences for quality, resulting in the demand for quality of care8
being a function of payment.  On the other side of this unofficial market we have the state salaried
physicians employed in a monopoly state acute hospital setting.
1  Often unmotivated and poorly
paid, they adjust the quality of care to the level of unofficial payment paid for by the patients, given
the preferences of the latter.  As said, health workers have a strong monopoly power over medical
knowledge (diagnostic and treatment) and patients’ discharge, which they can exploit to obtain
unofficial payments without a significant cost to them (e.g. no extra working time and sanctions are
weak).  They can allocate scarce state medicines and medical supplies to patients who pay
unofficially, keep patients in hospital or discharge them early (a significant power due to the lack of
follow-up service provision outside hospital).  Hence, physicians are seen as profit/income
maximisers choosing the payment -quality combination given patients’ demand for their services.
They exploit their monopoly position by engaging in discriminatory pricing and service
differentiation doing so with the knowledge that corruption is largely ignored by the state.  There
are many anecdotal reports of FSU and CEE state physicians adopting differential unofficial pricing
strategies and considerable evidence suggesting that patients are willing to pay unofficially for an
improvement in the quality of health care (Thompson and Witter 2000).
An important issue is whether unofficial payments are made for entitled services or some
enhanced level of care.  Patients may be asked to supply medicines and supplies required for their
treatment because the hospitals do not have these.  Or patients may be asked to purchase medicines
and supplies that are available and paid for through the state budget but often with a delay, which
patients may not wish/be able to bear.  Or a corrupt health worker may simply ask a patient for a
payment to ensure access to a basic level of service and/or imply that payment is linked to higher
quality care.  The patient accessing acute care is unlikely to know, or be in a position to question,
whether the care is in fact some enhanced level or the entitled level.  However, whatever the reason,
if she perceives that no payment leads to a sub-desirable care, she may be willing to pay.
Information asymmetry coupled with endemic unofficial payments places acute hospital
patients in an extremely vulnerable position.  While patients do not know what services should be
provided as part of their entitlement to state health care, physicians are fully aware of this
entitlement: medical standards define the scope of services to be provided for each diagnostic
category, include the scope and scale of diagnostic tests, medicines, and medical supplies and
define how many days that a patient should stay in hospital.  The health worker can exploit his
knowledge to obtain unofficial payments, allocating state resources to those who pay unofficially
and discharging accordingly.
                                               
1 We only examine the decision making process of physicians not of the hospital as a whole or its management team.9
3.1. A short review of the related literature
The physician agency literature can provide some useful insights into the behaviour and motivation
of state salaried physicians employed in the transition world.  Whilst the literature is predominantly
written within the North American context, a number of parallels can be established with salaried
state physicians working within endemic unofficial payment systems of the FSU and CEE when
they adopt patterns of market behaviour within state hospitals and explore some monopoly power.
Reviewing the literature McGuire (2000) argues that there are not many alternatives to a
profit maximising model subject to a demand.  Many papers present no formal conception or model
of the behaviour of the physician firm, while others looked at physicians as profit maximisers
setting prices for their services.  An element of monopoly power, which is explored by the
physician in the context of complete information, is present in most models.  Several authors (e.g.
Gaynor and Gertler, 1995; Ma and McGuire, 1997; Phelps, 1997; Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000)
analyse location, specialty, and care quality as elements that turn physicians into imperfect
substitutes and, as such, there is an element of monopoly power with the demand curve sloping
downwards.  McGuire (2000) presents a model of monopolistic competition where the price and
quantity of physician services are found by maximising the physician’s profit, subject to the
constraint on patient net benefit.  Patients face an all or nothing offer and all available consumer
surplus is extracted.  With market power and the non-retradability of healthcare, the physician
possesses the prerequisites for the exercise of first-degree price discrimination.  Hence, we believe
the profit maximising assumption is useful to analyse a context where patients are willing to pay
unofficially for extra quality and physicians are willing to exploit their power to provide it.
2
The literature on general discriminatory pricing (outside the health care sector) is large
(Tirole, 1988; Varian 1987) and it is well understood that non-retradability is behind models of this
nature.  Gaynor (1994) and Folland, Goodman, and Stano (1997) recognise that physician services
are heterogeneous and non-retradable thus supporting price discrimination.  Focusing on the
physician’s self interest, Kessel (1958), suggests that differences in physician fees could be
explained by differences in demand.  Ruffin (1973) describes a “charity-competition” model in
which price discrimination emerges as result of doctor utility maximisation.  Feldstein (1979) uses a
monopoly model to analyse physician’s pricing behaviour. The insights of these models are our
departing point.  We believe this literature fits well with the context under analysis.
3
                                               
2 One may wish to add others arguments to the physician objective function but we wish to concentrate on this
particular aspect of physician behaviour.
3 The literature on corruption may also provide useful insights concerning unofficial payments (see Bardhan, 1997 for a
review).  Lui (1985) presented an equilibrium queuing model of bribery where customers pay bribes in order to obtain a
better position in the queue. The size of the bribe was linked to the opportunity costs of time for the individual.  Myrdal10
3.2. Setting the quality - unofficial payment combination
Consider now, in the context of the parallel and unofficial market for health care described before,
the demand for two competing health care interventions or processes used to treat the same
condition but differing in some quality characteristic. The good being traded is treatment and each
consumer consumes one unit of the good, that is, a patient consumes care only once at a time (e.g.
one operation only).  According to some measure the treatment can have two different quality levels
or indeed be considered as two treatments - the low quality and the high quality treatment. For
example, a patient may be given two choices of surgery: low quality (e.g. basic/conventional
surgery) or high quality surgery (e.g. cholycystectomy).  The hospital physician might not officially
be permitted to use this technology for the treatment but has unofficial access to it.  Alternatively,
quality may be measured by some physician input such as time (or “effort”) devoted to the patient
so that the low quality treatment corresponds to basic consultation time and high quality treatment
means additional doctor’s time.  Another possible definition of treatment quality in the transition
context might be that where an acute surgical patient is given a choice of post-operative care,
implied by two differing lengths of stay proposed by the operating surgeon.  The patient may not
know what specific interventions will be administered post-operatively, however longer length of
stay may associated with increased patient’s utility because of the reassurance of knowing that if
any problems occur the physician will be on hand to address them.  Shorter lengths of stay for the
acute surgical patient would in this context create disutility because of perceived inadequate follow-
up on discharge.
4  Shorter lengths of stay in this context therefore might be recognised as some
basic or low level of health care quality with longer length of stay perceived as an enhanced or high
level of quality.  Also time spent waiting before admission may be perceived as a quality measure:
the longer the wait the lower the quality of care according to patients (e.g. Propper, 2000).
The indirect utility (measured in monetary terms) each patient derives from treatment
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(1968) argued that corrupt officials might, instead of speeding up queues, actually cause administrative delays in order
to attract more bribes, although Bardhan (1997) suggests that, in the context of pervasive and cumbersome regulations,
corruption may actually improve efficiency.  Galasi and Kertesi (1989) modelled bribes for quality in socialist countries
and showed that all consumers were worse off when some of them paid bribes to obtain higher than official quality care.
With fixed inputs, bribery reduces the quality available to those paying fixed or no price and induces more corruption,
resulting in everybody paying bribes yet obtaining quality no higher than the official level (see also Kornai, 2000).
4 There are a number of reports to suggest this is the case, particularly in rural areas (Ensor and Thompson, 1999)11
where  j is a positive parameter describing quality, with j=(jL,jH) and jL<jH, and L and H
referring respectively to the low quality and to high quality treatments as perceived by patients
5. q is
a positive real number that describes the taste for quality
6 and p is the price of treatment with
p=(pL,pH) and pL < pH, that is, the low quality treatment is charged a lower price (if it were more
expensive then no one would buy it).  The utility obtained with treatment is separable in price and
quality, the rationale behind it being that all consumers prefer a higher quality for a given price but
a consumer attributing a high value to quality is willing to pay more to obtain higher quality of care.
The parameter q is distributed according to some density function, f(q), reflecting the variation in
tastes among patients, and a cumulative distribution function F(q)  defined between zero and a
maximum value of q =q
M, [0, q
M]), with F(0) =0 and F(q
M)=1.  The utility of no treatment is zero.
A patient chooses the high quality treatment rather than the low quality one if the utility
obtained with the former is higher than that obtaining with the latter and higher than no treatment:
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Patients choose the low quality treatment whenever the utility associated with it is higher
than no treatment
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Thus,
￿  All those, who have preferences for quality higher than threshold q
Hc, buy the high quality
care e.g. longer length of stay (basic) or shorter admission time.
￿  All the patients, who have preferences for quality higher than threshold q
Lc, buy the low
quality treatment e.g. shorter length of stay (early discharge) or longer admission time.
￿  All the other patients for whom the threshold q  < q
Lc are excluded from care.
Given  N potential patients whose preferences for quality vary according to the density
function above, a proportion of these will buy the high quality treatment, another will buy the lower
quality treatment and some will buy no care.  Integrating the density function using the boundaries
defined by the above critical levels of the taste parameter, q, we obtain the demand for high quality
and low quality treatment and the demand for no treatment as functions of the unofficial payment:
                                               
5 For analytical simplicity and illustrative purposes we use only two discrete levels of quality.  This context can be
easily extended to one of a continuous range of quality levels.
6 It can also be seen as the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution between income and quality. In that case f(q) may
be related to the distribution of income among the potential consumers of the good treatment. Assuming the case of
income, this means that all consumers derive the same surplus from the treatment (in our case they get cured) but some
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Assume now that the physician knows that the demand for his services is composed of
heterogeneous consumers some of those with stronger preferences for the higher quality good.
7  The
physician chooses the unofficial payments pL and pH to maximise his utility knowing the above
demand functions.  We assume there may be a possible cost involved in the unofficial provision of
treatment for example the potential sanction imposed on the physician if found to be charging
unofficial payments, which is separable and linear.  The doctor’s maximisation problem is
() ( ) ,.) p , p ( D c p ,.) p , p ( D c p U max H L H H H H L L L L
D
p , p L H
- + - =            (7)
and the first order conditions are, with i,j=L,H and i¹j:
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This shows that the physician as a monopolist chooses the unofficial payments so that marginal
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Relationship (8) shows that the mark-up price of treatment i the term on the left-hand side of
the equation is a function of: 1) the inverse of the own elasticity of demand 1/e
D
ii, which is positive13
by our definition; and 2) the cross-elasticity and the mark-up for the other good.  As the treatments
are substitutes (patients can have only one type of treatment), the cross-elasticity, e
D
ji, is negative
according to the definition.  Thus, the mark-up price for good i is greater than just the inverse of the
own elasticity of demand.  It so appears that quality discrimination makes all patients pay a higher
price for care.  Both Galasi and Kertesi (1989) and Kornai (2000) reached a similar conclusion.
As our aim is to test the relationship between quality of care and payment, we assume that
patients’ preferences over quality are distributed uniformly, that is, q follows a uniform distribution.
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Solving the pair of equations defined by (A) with respect to the unofficial payments pH and pL we























































This relationship is the basis for the empirical analysis that follows.
8  Equation (9a) shows that the
quality dimension is positively related to the unofficial payment and negatively related to the cost of
providing care quality unofficially.  To a higher care quality corresponds a higher price and cost.  If
the results that follow show a positive association between payment and quality then the above
                                                                                                                                                           
7 Alternatively, some consumers have different marginal rates of substitution between income and quality of treatment.
8 We chose to have quality on the left hand side and price on the right hand side because our data suggests that patients
pay before entering hospital and receiving treatment so that relationship (9a) reflects better the reality of paying
unofficially for care in transition countries.  Moreover, to establish whether a higher payment leads to higher quality
(which implies a direction of causality) we must estimate relationship (9a).14
model may be a good representation of patients and physicians’ behaviour in what concerns
unofficial payments.
4. Data
The data used in this analysis come from a randomly selected survey of 1508 discharged surgical
and trauma inpatient patients treated in three hospitals in Almaty City, Kazakhstan, in 1999.  The
survey was conducted in January 2002 with a maximum of nine months elapsing between discharge
and interview.  Given the sensitivity of the survey (unofficial payments are part of an unofficial
market for care) patients were surveyed in their homes.  The questionnaire was conducted in the
Russian language with the help of the staff from the School of Public Health, Kazak State Medical
Univeristy.  Each of the 1508 patients included in the analysis is identified by an ICD10 code.
Thirty-seven codes were included in the survey representing the most common surgical and trauma
conditions treated in each of the departments.  They were also chosen because individuals suffering
from one of these codes were entitled to free care and thus all that was paid in hospital constituted
an unofficial payment.  The ICD10 codes were aggregated into four crude resource groups (RG1-4)
based on information on resource use provided by the Almaty City Health Administration.  Patients
were surveyed about their experience in hospital and related expenditure.  They were asked if they,
or their relatives/friends on their behalf, had paid (monetarily or non-monetarily) and the amount
paid in the admission department (AD), in the surgical/trauma ward, for medicines, and diagnostic
tests.
9  Patients stated how many minutes they had spent in the AD, the number of nights they had
spent in hospital and on the general quality of treatment.  These three variables were chosen as
indicators of quality of care so as to explore the relationship between the quality of care and
unofficial payments.  Information was obtained on patients’ socio-economic status: age, gender,
education, occupation, exemption status, and household expenditure (on food, utilities, clothes,
cigarettes and alcohol, cars, education, health care and pharmaceuticals, family celebrations and
support to relatives) as a proxy for household income.  We also gathered information on the referral
type (self-referral, polyclinic doctor or specialist, hospital specialist) and on whether the patient had
surgery.
4.1. Dependent variable: quality of care
Measuring quality in health care is generally a complex business.  Arrow (1963) recognised nearly
thirty years ago that “uncertainty as to the quality of the product is perhaps more intense than for
any other important commodity”.  One indicator of quality is the health worker’s “effort” and it is15
argued that unofficial payments are given to “motivate” physicians to provide more “effort”.
McGuire (2000) indeed suggests that “the care or effort that a doctor puts into a decision or
treatment matters to the patient but it is difficult to incorporate into a payment system” as it is not
directly observable.  Thus it becomes one of the most difficult quality indicators, leading to
contractability issues.  The discussion on how to measure quality of care is ongoing (for example
Campbell et al. (2000) suggest access to care and effectiveness as two main dimensions of quality
of care) but the measurement of quality of care is however becoming more common through an
increasingly available array of indicators.  These are often divided into three groups: outcome
measures (e.g. mortality rates), process or volume measures (e.g. day surgery, waiting time, length
of stay), and patient satisfaction, in an attempt to capture some aspect of quality due to the absence
of a correct, complete, and tangible measure of quality.  The problems with measuring quality and
contracting on outcomes (for these depend on patient characteristics e.g. genetics and the
technological process of care) have meant that process indicators such as time, more tangible and
more easily measured, have traditionally been used to measure quality and monitor and pay
providers.  For example McCall (1996), states that “the amount of time a doctor spends
interviewing and examining you and explaining things reflects how genuinely concerned a doctor
is”.  Also, lengths of stay and waiting times for inpatient and outpatient appointments are typically
used to monitor hospital performance.  Thus, in order to explore the relationship between unofficial
payments and the process of care, we make use of two process measures of health care quality - 1)
the waiting time (number of minutes) spent by the patient in the AD and 2) a patient’s length of stay
- LOS - or number of days spent in hospital, and complement these with a variable that measures
patient’s subjective measure of care quality.  They are explained below.
4.1.1 Time spent in the admission department
As said, time measures have often been use as process indicators of quality because they are more
easily measured.  A number of authors model the demand for inpatient care (e.g. Goddard et al.,
1995; Martin and Smith, 1999; Gravelle et al., 2003) examining the impact of waiting time.
Waiting time is frequently used as a quality proxy in studies of health service demand (e.g. Propper,
2000 where individuals vary in their valuation of this quality parameter) and long waits have been
seen by the general population as an unsatisfactory characteristic of the NHS (Bosanquet, 1988).
Such models provide useful insights to the analysis of unofficial payments for quality in a transition
country such as Kazakhstan, where state health care workers engage in quality enhancing activities
within the state hospital structure and patients entering hospital chose differing quality services.
                                                                                                                                                           
9 We find hardly any variation in these latter two categories i.e. everybody appears to be paying for drugs and tests.16
Moreover, previous studies of unofficial payments (e.g. Gaal, 1999a,b; Kornai, 2000; Lewis
et al., 2001) suggest that patients use such payments to obtain faster services than they would
otherwise and jump the queue and face a shorter wait or to save time.  In other words patients are
paying an extra fee for immediate referral.  Waiting could thus be seen as a measure of health care
quality, and the shorter the wait the higher the quality of care.
Table 1 (appendix 2) shows, by hospital and resource group, the first indicator of quality:
the number of minutes that patients spend in the admission department (AD) prior to a clinical
intervention.  The average period of time a patient spends in the department is approximately 55
minutes with small variations between hospitals and within resource groups.  A further glance at
Table 1 shows that a large number of patients fall into resource groups 2 and 3.  There are few
patients coded as group 1 in hospital 3 (trauma).  As the time for admission is positively skewed a
log transformation was performed on the variable (lnadmwait).  Furthermore, the variable was
standardised by ICD10 code.  A negative coefficient for the unofficial payment is to be expected if
a longer waiting time is seen as the inverse of a higher care quality.
4.1.2. Length of hospital stay (LOS)
The empirical analysis discussed in this paper also focuses on length of stay (LOS) as an indicator
of health care quality.  Variations in LOS may point to differences in the quality of health care
provision although we may need to distinguish between the developed world and that of transition.
In OECD countries, Barnum and Kutzin (1993) argue, longer stays do not necessarily contribute to
higher-quality care (although patients may not necessarily perceive it to be so): LOS for most
conditions has decline during the last thirty years in most OECD countries and the health of the
population has not declined.  Improvements in the technical quality of hospital care and most
importantly a much wider availability of community care and local facilities to provide follow up
care have made this possible
10 although concerns are sometimes raised about early discharge, post-
surgical complications, and hospital readmission.  In the transition world the situation is quite
different.  Health facilities are limited in number and often located in cities far from an important
part of the population.  Post-hospital follow-up is poor or non-existent and transport to hospital is
limited and costly, especially from remote areas.  Quality of care has regressed with the transition
process and the consequent economic crisis.  In this context, a longer stay in hospital increases
patients’ reassurance and decreases the probability of post-treatment complications and
                                               
10 In several OECD countries and for reimbursement purposes, LOS has been used as a proxy for resource use and
technical inefficiency.17
readmission, as doctors monitor the patient condition for longer.  Hence, a longer LOS may be
perceived as better quality of care by patients in the transition world.
Table 2 (in appendix 2) shows length of hospital stay by hospital and resource group, the
mean of which is approximately 14 days.  There are large differences between hospitals 1 and 2
(surgical) and hospital 3 (trauma).  In hospitals 1 and 2 length of stay is under 10 days where as in
hospital 3 length of stay is over 20 days.  As one might expect there are also differences in length of
stay between resource groups.  Once again the data is positively skewed so that a log transformation
was performed (lnlos).  Furthermore, the variable was standardised by ICD10 code.  A positive sign
is thus expected for the coefficient estimate associated with payment if a longer LOS proxies a
higher (perceived) quality of care.
4.1.3. Subjective measure of the quality of care
Patients were also asked to characterise the quality of care received using an ordered categorical
variable ranging from “Very poor” and “Poor” to “Satisfactory”, “Good”, and “Very good” quality
of care.  Patients had to choose one of the five categories.  We believe this subjective measure of
the quality of care received can complement the analysis using the process variables just discussed.
It reflects patients’ perception of the level of quality received, perhaps proxying patients’
satisfaction, and allows us to use an extra non-process quality indicator.  Moreover, if the empirical
results are consistent across models using process or subjective/categorical variables then the
analysis can be deemed more robust.  Table 3 (appendix 2) shows the distribution of patients’
responses to the questionnaire. We also sum the two last categories, “Poor” and “Very poor”, into
one category (“Poor plus very poor” - in italic) which results in a smoother distribution of responses
across categories, from “Poor plus very poor” to “Satisfactory”, “Good” and “Very good”.
Overall, more than 55% of the patients considered the quality of care received to be “Good”
with around 13% considered it to be “Very good”. About 22.3% of the patients thought the quality
of care was “Satisfactory” while 6.2% thought of it as “Poor” and “1.5% “Very Poor” (with almost
8% perceiving quality of care to be poor or very poor).  The same sort of distribution can be seen
across hospitals with the “Good” category registering the highest percentage of answers (always
more than 50%) followed by “Satisfactory” (between 19% and 25%) and “Very good” (between
11,3% and 14%).  “Poor” and “Very poor” vary between 4% and 8.8% and 1% to 2% respectively.
Hospital 3 (Trauma) registers the best scores in that only 5% considered care to be of a poor or very
poor quality (and more than 60% considered it to be good) while for hospital 2 this percentage is
around 11% (and for hospital 1 is 6.6%).  In the regression analysis and given the smallest
percentage of responses associated with category “Very poor” we use the pooled “poor plus very18
poor” category.  We expect that payment is positively associated with a better quality of care while
negatively associated with a worst category of care.
4.2. Independent Variables
As we focus on the relationship between the quality of care obtained and the unofficial payment
made we gathered information on whether, how much, and where patients paid.  The general idea
developed through the interviewing process was that payment negotiation takes place as soon as the
patient arrives to the hospital in the AD and before treatment takes place (e.g. patients seek to
reduce admission time by paying) with patients agreeing to a certain amount for a certain quality
level.  However, although negotiation and agreement take place in the AD and before treatment,
some patients do not pay all at once in the AD (e.g. because they cannot afford) and some pay after
admission takes place while in the ward. As a result, given the information gathered with the
questionnaire, we consider two unofficial payments variables: 1) Payment1 the amount of unofficial
payment made by the individual before treatment takes place and in the AD; and 2) Payment2, the
amount of unofficial payment made after admission takes place when already in the ward. Both are
in their logs due to their skewed distribution.  We also consider payment-hospital interactions.
In order to isolate the association between the quality of care and payment it is important to
understand and control for other factors.  Martin and Smith (1996) conclude that LOS is related to
patient characteristics and hospital characteristics.  Studies typically find that patient age and
severity or DRG status are important determinants of LOS (e.g. Godfarb et al., 1983; Cairns and
Munroe, 1992) and patients of lower socio-economic status have longer LOS (e.g. Epstein et al.,
1990).  Hence, as regressors we use age, gender, and resource groups to proxy for severity, and
occupation, income and exemption to account for socio-economic differences.
The importance of hospital characteristics and organisational factors in determining length
of stay has been established in some studies (e.g. Cannoodt and Knickman, 1984; Burns and
Wholey, 1991; Xiao et al. 1997; Westert et al. 1993).  These suggest that the organisation of
discharge and unplanned admissions and physician workload can be relevant in determining LOS,
as can the way by which inpatient services are financed (constant per diem fee or prospective
payments may respectively increase or decrease it).  Ensor and Thompson (1999) highlight that,
whereas FSU and CEE countries used the criteria of beds and bed-days to fund hospitals,
encouraging long LOSs, the system has now been replaced by case-based and prospective payment
using DRGs introducing new incentives to promptly discharge patients.  Medical standards specify
the number of days a patient should stay in hospital.  We do not have such detailed information on
providers (although medical standards and the reimbursement method apply equally to all the 319
hospitals studied thus reducing the need to control for such variables) and therefore control for
differences across hospitals (e.g. number of beds or doctors) using dummy variables.
Table 4 (appendix 2) provides a list of the dependent and independent variables used in the
models.  Table 5 presents some summary statistics.  As before on average patients spent around 55
minutes in the AD waiting for a clinical intervention while spending around 14 days in hospital.
About 33% of the patients paid in the AD while 22% paid when already in the ward with 6% of the
patients paying in both places.  On average individuals paid 2,950 KZT before receiving any
clinical intervention and 1,797 KZT while already in the ward. Average montly income is around
20,683 KZT with the smallest income equal to 1,131 KZT.  Around 25% and 50% of the
respondents had respectively a monthly income of less then 10,000 and 17,340 KZT.  Payment and
income do vary considerably across individuals as suggested by the standard deviation.  Half of the
respondents are male and average age is 43 years.  13% are students, 18% are unemployed, 12%
work in private companies, 4% are self-employed, 25% are retired and 10% are housewives.  About
28% of the respondents are considered exempted from any payment for health care.  Around 40%
of all patients go to hospitals 2 and 3 while 19% go to hospital 1.  More than 50% of patients are
coded as RG3, with 33% coded as RG2 and around 7% in each of the other two diagnostic groups.
5. Regression analysis
The econometric models described and tested below explore the relationship between unofficial
payment and (1) number of minutes spent in the AD; (2) LOS or number of days spent in hospital
and (3) the patient’s subjective measure of quality.  We start by exploring the two first relationships
by undertaking simple linear least squares’ analysis (OLS regressions).  Four specifications are
estimated in total using the two different process indicators - admission wait and LOS - as
dependent variables.  We estimate the relationship between each of the two quality indicators and
the unofficial payment as a binary variable, thus exploring whether the act of paying (Pay1 and
Pay2) is associated with the admission time or the LOS.  We then use the amount paid
(lnpayment1 and lnpayment2) as the regressor and check in which way the continuous variable
relates to waiting time or LOS.  We consider the two unofficial payments separately but
simultaneously (rather then their sum), the reason being that some patients although agreeing to pay
when in the AD and before treatment, pay later, when already in the ward.  Patients may not have
the required amount ready at the moment of admission.  Keeping payments separate allows us to
distinguish each payment’s effect and control for potential endogeneity reasons (see below).
When considering quality of care as perceived by patients, an ordered probit model
(Maddala, 1983; Greene, 1993; STATA, 2002) is the estimation method used to account for the20
ordinal nature of the dependent variable.  Perceived quality is indeed a categorical variable ordering
care using four categories from “Poor plus very poor” to “Very Good”.  This model is built around
a latent regression y*=xb+e where y* is unobserved and what is observed is for example y=0 if
y*<m1; y=1 if m1<y*<m2;  y=2 if m2<y*<m3; … y=J if mJ<y*.  The ms are parameters to be
estimated, together with the b, and constitute cut off points.  The idea is that each respondent could
potentially define y* (given the regressors and unobservables) but given the categories proposed
chooses the one closest to his answer.  Assuming the residuals follow a normal distribution we can
define the probabilities of the different possible outcomes as: Prob(y=0)=Pr(xb+e<m1)=Pr(e<m1-
xb)=F(m1-xb);Prob(y=1)=Pr(m1<xb+e<m2)=Pr(m1-xb<e<m2-xb)=F(m2-xb)-F(m1-xb)…Pr(y=J)=
Pr(mJ<xb+e)=1-F(mJ-xb).  Note that the marginal effects of the regressors, x, on the probabilities
(¶F(x,b)/¶x) are not equal to the coefficients only, but rather: ¶Pr(y=0)/¶x=-f(m1-xb).b,
¶Pr(y=1)/¶x=[f(m1-xb)-f(m2-xb)].b, … ¶Pr(y=J)/¶x=f(mj-xb).b.  Thus, to understand the relationship
between payment and quality of care we need a fair amount of calculation.  We need to see how the
probability for each category changes with payment.
In terms of regression diagnostics used to assess the specification of the models these
include firstly, in the case of the OLS the calculation of variance inflation factors (VIF) to assess for
multicollinearity of the regressors.  Second, we address potential heteroskedasticity by specifying
the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance.  Finally, we compute the Ramsey reset test for
each of the OLS models estimated
11 and a Wald (c2) test for each of the ordered probit models
estimated.  These test for the general model specification namely in terms of omitted variables.
Finally, we test for the potential endogeneity of payment in the ward (lnpayment2) using the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993).  The endogeneity problem may arise
from the fact that patients once experiencing the wait in the AD and LOS change their preferences
concerning waiting and therefore the payment they make in the ward.  In other words, lnpayment2
may be endogenous.
12  Thus, we regress the potential endogenous variable on all the other
explanatory variables together with any other variables that may help explaining payment.  We
compute the predicted residuals from this regression and introduced them into the original
regression (OLS or ordered probit) so as to establish the significance of the corresponding
coefficient estimate.  An estimate that is statistically significantly different from zero suggests that
                                               
11 This Ramsey Reset test introduces the predicted values of the dependent variable in their second, third, and fourth
power into the regression and tests the joint significance of the respective coefficient estimates.  It amounts to estimate
y=xb+zt+u (where z stands for the three powers of the predicted values of y) and test t=0. The Wald test consists of
introducing the square of the predicted values of the dependent variable in the regression and testing the significance of
the associated coefficient estimate.
12 The definition of Pay1 makes it exogenous.21
endogeneity may be in place.  In that case the variable has to be instrumented for and a two stage
least squares (2SLS) regression run in the case of OLS or the predicted values of the variable used
instead of the observed values in the case of the ordered probit.
5.1. Time spent in the Admission Department (minutes)
As said, we examine the relationship between the time spent in the AD, defined as the total time a
patient spends in the AD, from the time of admission to hospital to transfer to theatre or the ward,
and a) the act of paying and b) the amount of unofficial payments made. The models can formally
and generically specified as:
e hospital Exemption occupation
income ln pay gender age RG admwait ln
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
b b b
b b b b b b
        (10a)
e payment ln * hospital hospital Exemption occupation
income ln payment ln gender age RG admwait ln
+ + + + +
+ + + + + =
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
b b b b
b b b b b b
       (10b)
with hospital 1, a surgical provider, and RG2 the reference hospital and the reference resource
group.  The results are presented in Tables 6 (act of paying) and 7 (amount of payment) in appendix
2.  We specify the model using pooled data and data for each of the hospitals to assess differences
across hospitals.  When using the continuous payment variable we also specify a hospital-payment
interaction model with the pooled data.
Looking at table 6 and at the models that pass the Ramsey Reset test – the regression models
for hospital 1 and 2, we find that paying the AD - Pay_1 -is negatively and significantly associated
with a shorter time for admission in hospital 1, a surgical hospital, as indicated by the robust
coefficient estimates.  The act of paying is not associated with the time waiting for admission in
hospital 2.  The remaining models in Table 6 are deemed misspecified so that we cannot say much
about the act of paying and its relation to the admission time when in those cases.  Hence, surgical
patients in hospital 1 waiting for surgery may perceive it to be worth making a payment in an
attempt to decrease admission time.  In hospital 1, being a student decreases the time in the AD
while being retired increases it.  In hospital 2, workers in the private sector- privwork - face a
lower waiting time in the AD.  Paying in the hospital ward – Pay_2 - appears to be positively
associated with admission wait.  However, further inspection shows that it may be the case in
hospital 3 (trauma).  Moreover, both models do not pass the Reset test so that the positive
association must be seen with caution.
13
                                               
13 Patients in hospital 3 may be agreeing to pay but pay after admission and “loose” time in the AD in the process of
bargaining.  Also, this variable may include payments made for reasons other than admission time, so that it is not
necessarily the case that a negative relationship should be observed.22
Examination of the amount paid in the AD (lnpayment1) and in the ward (lnpayment2) and
their relation with admission time (Table 7), in the models considered well specified as suggested
by the Ramsey Reset test, indicates that paying unofficially in the AD or in the ward is significantly
associated with a lower waiting time for admission in the case of hospital 1, the surgical provider.
These payments are not related to admission time in the case of hospital 2.  Looking at the
remaining models namely that with the interactions we can see that indeed the two payments are
negatively related to admission time in hospital 1 only.  The other models are again misspecified.
When looking at socio-economic factors, we find that retired individuals (as compared to state
workers) wait longer for admission to surgery in hospital 1 while students have shorter admission
waits.  Private sector workers - privwork - face a lower wait in the AD in hospital 2.  Income –
lnincome - is positively associated with waiting time for surgery in hospital 1, the rationale being
that income is often a proxy for health status so that those richer and thus healthier may wait longer.
Finally, testing for potential endogeneity of the payment in the ward (lnpayment2) suggests
that payment in the ward is not endogenous when admission time (lnadmwait) is analysed.
14
Therefore, we can conclude that, in hospital 1, paying in the AD is associated with a shorter wait,
and the higher the unofficial payment, the shorter the admission wait is.  In other words, patients in
hospital 1 paid both in the AD and in the ward so as to reduce the time for admission. If time spent
in the AD is indeed a proxy for quality of care so that the lower the time spent in the AD, the higher
the quality, then the results support the theoretical model developed previously: patients pay
unofficially to obtain better quality of care and physicians provide a differentiated service.  These
results also support the anedoctal reports of surgical patients interviewed during the survey process.
5.2. Length of hospital stay (days)
The second set of models examines the relationship between the dependent variable defined as
number of days spent in hospital and the unofficial payments.  The model is generally specified as:
e hospital Exemption occupation
income ln pay gender age RG LOS ln
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
b b b
b b b b b b
        (11a)
e payment ln * hospital hospital Exemption occupation
income ln payment ln gender age RG LOS ln
+ + + + +
+ + + + + =
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
b b b b
b b b b b b
       (11b)
Again we make use of both unofficial payments - in the AD and in the ward - as explanatory
variables the rationale being that patients may agree to pay for the care quality (e.g. LOS) they are
                                               
14 Note that we first of all wish to look for evidence of an association between payments and quality after controlling for
other variables.  As such endogeneity is not an issue.  For diagnostic rigour and for those wishing to learn further on the
direction of causality we test for potential endogeneity.23
to receive when they first encounter the hospital staff, that is, whilst in the AD and before
admission, but some may however need to pay in instalments.
Table 8 shows the robust results of the regression of hospital LOS and the act of paying
unofficially (binary variable) in the AD and in the ward.  In the models that pass the Ramsey Reset
test –pooled model and that of hospital 1 - it can be seen that patients admitted to hospital 1 stayed
in hospital less time than those going to the other hospitals with hospital 3 registering the longer
LOS.  Those coded in RG3 and RG4 stay longer in hospital.  Patients paying unofficially (in the
AD or in the ward) have a longer stay in hospital, that is, pay_1 and pay_2 (especially in hospital 1)
are positively and significantly associated with a longer LOS.  Finally, being a man or a housewife
increases hospital LOS while income decreases it. When looking at hospital 1 it is mainly the ward
payment that appears to be related to LOS.
Examination of the amount paid in the AD or in the ward (Table 9) shows that these are
positively and significantly associated with a longer stay in hospital.  Lnpayment1 and
lnpayment2 are positively related to LOS in all hospitals, with the association between lnpayment1
and LOS and that between lnpayment2 and LOS stronger in hospital 3 and 2 respectively.  Age is
positively related with LOS.  Both housewives and men spend a longer time in hospital while
students stay less long.  Patients in RG3 and RG4 spend the longest in hospital.  Income, perhaps
reflecting health status, is negatively related to LOS: the less healthy stay longer in hospital.
Note that the R
2 values are quite high and all models, but that for hospital 2, pass the
Ramsey Reset test.  Checking for the potential endogeneity of the unofficial payment made by
patients when in the ward - lnpayment2 we find that it may take place in the contexts of the pooled
model and that for hospital 3.  Running a 2SLS estimation, where we instrument lnpayment2 using
the entire set of the explanatory variables above plus education, referral type and surgery variables,
we obtain a stronger positive and significant relationship between the amount paid in the ward and
the LOS in (Table 9A in appendix 2).
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We can conclude that in acute surgery and trauma hospitals in urban Kazakhstan, paying
unofficially in the AD and in the ward are related to a longer LOS in hospital.  Moreover, the bigger
the payment made, the longer is the stay, especially in the trauma context.  Therefore, if LOS is a
proxy for quality, which is potentially the case in Kazakhstan where post-hospital treatment is
virtually non-existent, transport to hospital quite limited and expensive, and thus increased stay in
hospital reassuring, then it can be said that patients are paying to improve the quality of care they
                                               
15 Note that instruments in a cross-section context may be limited namely when using a survey.  Thus, it is argued that
the initial OLS analysis may still be “first-best”.  We present both models.  If the focus is the sign not the magnitude of
the association the results are in line with each other.24
receive.  Or, possibly, patients pay not to be discharged too early but have the required LOS for
their condition.
5.3. Perceived quality (categorical ordered variable)
The second model examines the relationship between the perceived quality of care - a categorical
variable taking four values (1=Poor plus very poor; 2=Satisfactory; 3=Good; 4=Very good) and
ranking patients’ perceptions in relation to the care received - and the unofficial payments. As
mentioned, given the ordering characteristic of the dependent variable we use an ordered probit
estimation.  Again we make use of both types of unofficial payments, in the AD and in the ward.
Due to the increased number of computations we have to undergo to analyse the relationship
between payment and quality of care in this context we concentrate on the amount of payment made
(continuous payment variables) only.  The model can be generally specified as:
e payment ln * hospital hospital Exemption occupation
income ln payment ln gender age RG Quality   Perceived
+ + + + +
+ + + + + =
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
b b b b
b b b b b b
 (12)
We test for endogeneity of the payment in the ward (Lnpayment2) and find that it may be
endogenous.  We therefore estimate Lnpayment2 using the entire set of the explanatory variables
above plus education, referral type and surgery variables and introduce the predicted values of
Lnpayment2 from this regression (lnpayment2_hat) into the ordered probit analysis (table 10B).
The results on table 10B and for the models passing the Wald test for general specification
(non-pooled models and pooled with interactions) suggest that indeed a higher payment in the AD
and a higher payment in the ward are associated with a higher perceived quality of care received as
indicated by the positive and significant coefficient estimates of the payment variables.  However,
to fully understand the relationship between payment and quality of care we need to calculate the
marginal effect of the regressors on each of the probabilities, that is, see how the probability for
each category changes with payment.
Table 11 presents three possible cases (among the many potential combinations of values for
the regressors).  First, we use the mean value of all the explanatory variables.  Second, we consider
all dummies equal to zero (thus marginal effects are computed for females, in Hospital 1, in RG2,
that are state workers and non-exempted patients, considering mean age and income). Finally, we
attribute the value of one or zero to each dummy depending on whether its mean is closer to one or
zero and whether it is one of the most representative groups (thus the marginal effects are computed
for males, in Hospital 3, in RG3, that are state workers, not exempted from formal hospital
charges, given average age and income).  Overall, that is, for the above combinations and for all
hospitals payment in the AD (Lnpayment1) and payment in the ward (Lnpayment2) decrease the25
probability of receiving “Poor and very poor” as well as “Satisfactory” quality of care, and increase
the probability of receiving a “Good” and “Very good” quality of care.  The association between
Lnpayment1 and quality of care is the strongest for hospital 2 followed by hospital 3, while that
between Lnpayment2 and quality of care is the strongest for the strongest for hospital 2 followed
by hospital 1, as suggested by the interaction terms.  Patients going to hospital 3 as compared to
hospital 1 are more likely to consider care as “Good” and “Very good” and less likely to consider it
“Satisfactory” or “Poor and very poor”.  The opposite holds for those going to hospital 2 as
compared to 1 (and 3).  Those in RG1 are more likely to classify care as of a “Good” or “Very
good” category.  The same is observed for those in RG3, while the opposite holds for those in RG4
(although these two relationships do not appear to be significant).  Age has no effect on perceived
quality.  Men are more likely to consider the quality of care to be “Poor and very poor” or
“Satisfactory” rather than “Good” or “Very good”.  The richer the patients are the more likely they
are to define care quality as “Poor and very poor” and “Satisfactory” (although relationship is not
significant).  In terms of occupation being retired increases the likelihood of seeing care as “Good”
and “Very good” while it decreases the other two categories (with similar results for student,
unemployed, and private workers when in the case of hospital 2).  Exempt has the opposite effect.
Concentrating on the payment variables and their marginal effect, we have also looked at
various other possible combinations different from those above (another type of diagnostic group or
occupation considering each of the hospitals and each gender type) as shown in table 12.  As before,
payment decreases the probabilities of receiving “Poor and very poor care” and “Satisfactory care”
while increasing the probabilities of obtaining “Good” and “Very good” care for most
combinations.  The exception can be observed when considering retired patients in hospitals 1 and
3.  When these are taken into account payment increases the probability of receiving “Very good
care” while decreasing the probability of receiving care of a lower level.  Similarly if we consider
patients coded as RG1 in hospital 3.  In more detail one can seen that for example that in absolute
terms the marginal effects of payment on “Poor and very poor” quality and on “Good” are higher
for men while women have stronger marginal effects for “Satisfactory” and “Very good” care
quality.  Patients coded in RG4 have a higher marginal effect of payment (in absolute terms) than
those in RG3, while these have a higher marginal effect than those in RG1 when looking at “Poor
and very poor” quality and “Good” quality.  The opposite holds when looking at “Very good”
quality.  Again retired individuals have a higher marginal effect of payment for the two top classes.26
6. Preliminary Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we use theoretical and empirical analysis to investigate unofficial payments for health
care in the transition world using the example of Kazakhstan.  Following claims that patients
perceive state health care provision to be poor and thus are willing to pay unofficially in an attempt
to improve the quality of care received (e.g. reduce the time spent in the admission department), we
presented a theoretical model that formalised this informal market for health care quality that takes
place within state facilities.  Patients’ utility was thus assumed to depend on health care quality and
monetary payment with patients having heterogeneous preferences for care quality.  The resulting
demand was therefore a function of payment and quality level.  Physicians on the other side, having
more information on diagnostic and information and enough ability to manipulate queues, decide
upon resource use and treatment, exploited their monopoly position and maximised their unofficial
income by engaging in discriminatory pricing and service differentiation (i.e. offering differing
levels of service quality to paying and non-paying patients), doing so with the knowledge that
corruption is largely ignored by the state.  In equilibrium the level of unofficial payment made was
thus positively associated with the level of quality of care.
We then conducted an empirical exploration of whether, other things being equal, patients in
Kazakhstan are indeed paying unofficially to see the quality of care they receive improved.  We
constructed a unique data set from a survey of 1508 discharged patients treated in three hospitals in
Almaty City, Kazakhstan for conditions whose treatment was completely and officially free of any
charge.  Given the sensitivity of the issue they were interviewed in their homes and shortly after
discharge.  We gathered information on their social and economic status and their experience in
hospital.  Bearing in mind the problems associated with the measurement of health care quality
(McGuire, 2000) and in the absence of a correct, complete and tangible indicator, we computed two
process measures of quality of care and patients’ subjective evaluation using a categorical variable
to investigate whether the above positive relationship between unofficial payment and care quality
does hold, that is, whether payment is related to patients wanting to spend less time in the admission
department, whether they would want to spend more time in hospital, and whether in their opinion
they received better care.  It is likely that the acutely ill patient relies on the physician to address his
health care needs promptly and effectively.  Yet, we think it realistic to assume that patients would
want to be processed quicker in the admission department (e.g. Propper 2000; Bishai et al. 2000.) or
that patients may wish to stay in hospital for as long as it takes to be reassured that their health
status has indeed improved as a result of the treatment when follow-up care is poor or inexistent and27
transport to hospital expensive.  We find significant variation in terms of amounts paid, length of
stay and perceived quality of care.
We conducted both OLS and ordered probit analysis, controlling for potential
heteroskedasticity and endogeneity, and conducting the necessary and respective diagnostic tests.
The (robust and well specified) results obtained showed significant associations between unofficial
payments and quality of care received as measured by two process indicators - time a patient spends
in the admission department and the number of days spent in hospital as well as by patients’
subjective (categorical/ordered) measure of care quality.  Indeed, the empirical analysis suggested
that: 1) paying in the admission department before treatment takes place and the amount paid both
in the admission department and in the ward is associated with a reduction in the admission time in
hospital 1 (surgery); 2) paying and the unofficial payment made in the admission department and in
the ward are associated with longer length of stay in all hospitals; and 3) the amount paid
unofficially increases the likelihood of considering the quality of care to be “Good” or “Very
good”.  Note that the positive association between payment and LOS may reflect, in reality, not
extra days than necessary but simply the fact that patients are paying to remain in hospital for the
number of days specified by medical standards, while those not paying stay in hospital are
discharged too early (as specified by medical standards).  By discharging non-paying patients
earlier physicians are freeing up beds for other patients who might pay.  It is also likely that patients
may also be paying for reassurance and increased physician “effort”.  In that case the two process
indicators are proxying only some dimensions of quality (although anedoctal reports suggest that
patients may be paying to reduce the wait for admission).  However we do find evidence of a strong
association between payment and process as well as payment and the subjective evaluation of care
received, that is, the results are robust across the three indicators which suggests that patients that
make an unofficial payment do indeed receive different health care than that of those that do not
pay anything.  Moreover, the results and their consistency support the theoretical formalisation
developed for the unofficial market for health care quality whereby patients with heterogeneous
valuations of quality pay to receive better care and physicians exploit their monopoly power and
provide a differentiated service to those paying and not paying.
This paper is a first attempt to use both economic theory and econometric tools to analyse
the issue of unofficial payments and explore whether prior payment influences the quality of care
received (measured using process and subjective indicators of quality) as compared to previous
studies that were restricted to answering the “whom, how much, when and to whom” of the matter.
We use a discriminatory price differentiated service model to formalise the unofficial market for
quality of care and both ordinary least squares and ordered probit analysis to test it.  We also use a28
unique and detailed data set on discharged acute hospital patients that accurately identifies the
amount paid unofficially while most previous studies did/could not distinguish between official and
unofficial payments for care.  Future research may extend the analysis to other transition countries.
It would be also interesting to look at length of stay and its relation to unofficial payment using
survival analysis.
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Appendix 1
The doctor’s maximisation problem is
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which shows that the monopolistic doctor chooses prices so that marginal revenue equals marginal
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for the first term on the right hand side (rhs) is the inverse of the own elasticity of demand, i.e.
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Table 1: Minutes spent in admission department by hospital and resource group (mean, s. d., no)

































































Table 2: Days spent in hospital by hospital and resource group (mean, s.d ,no)

































































Table 3: Distribution of responses (no and percentage) characterising the quality of care
(categorical variable) by hospital
Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Total
Perceived quality Obs. Percent Obs. Percent Obs. Percent Obs. Percent
Very good 34 11.33% 78 12.94% 85 14.05% 197 13.06%
Good 171 57% 313 51.91% 374 61.82% 858 56.9%
Satisfactory 75 25% 146 24.21% 115 19.01% 336 22.28%
Poor 17 5.67% 53 8.79% 24 3.97% 94 6.23%
Very poor 3 1% 13 2.16% 7 1.16% 23 1.53%
Poor plus very poor 20 6.6% 6 10.95% 31 5.12% 117 7.76%
Total 300 603 605 1508
Table 4: Variables used in the empirical analysis
Variable code Description
Dependent
Lnadmwait The log of the number of minutes an individual spends in the Admission Department
Lnlos The log of the number of days an individual spends in hospital
Perceived quality Categorical ordered variable: 1=not good, 2=satisfactory, 3=good and 4=very good
Independent
Socio-economic variables
Age Age, in years




Student, unemployed, state employee, private company employee, self employed, retired,
housewife,  (Dummy variables)
Exempt Registered exempt = 1(Dummy variable)








Pay_2 (binary variables: 1=patient paid and 0=patient did not pay)
The log of the amount of KZT paid in the Admission Dept
The log of the amount of KZT paid in the ward
Hospital specific variables
Hospital 1, Hospital 2,





Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
Admwait 1368 55.512 52.765 3 720
Lnadmwait 1368 3.782 0.749 1.792 6.583
LOS 1496 13.556 13.081 1 90
LnLOS 1496 2.592 0.622 1.386 4.533
Independent variables
Pay_1 1508 0.338 0.473 0 1
Payment1 1452 2949.345 6145.867 0 52000
Lnpayment1 1452 3.397 3.528 1.099 10.859
Pay_2 1508 0.202 0.402 0 1
Payment2 1483 1796.129 4743.295 0 35000
Lnpayment2 1483 2.538 3.025 1.099 10.463
Age 1508 42.989 18.004 5 89
Male 1508 0.505 0.500 0 1
Income 1494 20683.010 14745.390 1130.348 144000
Lnincome 1494 9.726 0.660 7.030 11.878
Student 1508 0.133 0.340 0 1
Unemploy 1508 0.184 0.387 0 1
Privwork 1508 0.117 0.322 0 1
Selfwork 1508 0.036 0.188 0 1
Retired 1508 0.253 0.435 0 1
Houswife 1508 0.102 0.303 0 1
Exempt 1508 0.284 0.451 0 1
RG1 1508 0.072 0.259 0 1
RG2 1508 0.334 0.472 0 1
RG3 1508 0.521 0.500 0 1
RG4 1508 0.074 0.261 0 1
Hospital 1 1508 0.199 0.399 0 1
Hospital 2 1508 0.400 0.490 0 1
Hospital 3 1508 0.401 0.490 0 136
Regression analysis
Note:  Payment variables are all assumed to be unofficial payments made in either the admission
department (pay_1 and lnpayment1) or on the ward (pay_2 and lnpayment2).  The tables presented
here show estimates using binary payment variables (yes/no response) and continuous payment
variables.  The nature of the variable transformation is defined at the head of each table.
Table 6: Admission time regressed on whether or not an unofficial payment was made.
Pooled Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3
Binary Pay Binary Pay Binary Pay Binary Pay
Admission time Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(lnadmwait)
Hospital 3 (Trauma) -0.0659
Hospital 2 -0.0807
Rg1 0.0804 -0.0594 0.0887 0.3262*
Rg3 0.0705 -0.0998 -0.0085 0.1860**
Rg4 0.1159 -0.0270 0.1467 0.2013
Age -0.0028 -0.0067 0.0001 -0.0020
Male -0.0030 -0.1100 -0.0218 0.0524
Lnincome -0.0327 0.2086** 0.0339 -0.2024*
Pay_1 0.0445 -0.2068** 0.0042 0.1766**
Pay_2 0.1433* -0.0739 0.1015 0.3104*
Student -0.1167 -0.3778** -0.0805 -0.0551
Unemploy 0.0538 0.1929 0.0742 0.0160
Privwork -0.0739 0.2045 -0.2642*** -0.0378
Selfwork 0.0902 -0.1360 0.2184 0.0092
Retired 0.1517 0.7162* 0.3143 -0.4110***
Houswife 0.0567 0.0978 0.0655 -0.0034
Exempt -0.1087 -0.2307 -0.3248 0.3347
_cons 4.1802* 2.1032** 3.4215* 5.5740*
No of observations 1358 253 567 538
R2 0.0163 0.1044 0.0332 0.0752
Ramsey Reset test F(3,1337)=3.13 F(3,234)=0.58 F(3,548)=0.49 F(3,548)=3.27
Prob>F=0.0247 Prob>F=0.6275 Prob>F=0.6869 Prob>F=0.0212
Mean VIF 2.16 2 2.21 2.28
Notes: *, **, and *** stand for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Estimations are robust.37
Table 7: Admission time regressed on amount paid as unofficial payment (continuous).
Pooled Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Pooled
Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay
Interactions
Admission Time Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(lnadmwait)
Hospital 3 (Trauma) -0.0495 -0.3359*
Hospital 2 -0.0766 -0.2350**
Rg1 0.0631 -0.1125 0.0819 0.1293 0.0598
Rg3 0.0757 -0.1198 -0.0150 0.2026* 0.0641
Rg4 0.1073 -0.0325 0.1212 0.2089 0.1174
Age -0.0023 -0.0074 0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0024
Male -0.0044 -0.1418 -0.0170 0.0468 -0.0059
Lnincome -0.0239 0.2611* 0.0330 -0.1973* -0.0179
Lnpayment1 0.0115*** -0.0436* 0.0060 0.0382* -0.0270***
Hosp2*lnpayment1 0.0322***
Hosp3*lnpayment1 0.0641*
Lnpayment2 0.0153** -0.0218*** 0.0142 0.0360* -0.0189***
Hosp2*lnpayment2 0.0354**
Hosp3*lnpayment2 0.0483*
Student -0.1052 -0.3708*** -0.0821 0.0255 -0.1063
Unemploy 0.0433 0.2266 0.0559 0.0101 0.0529
Privwork -0.1035 0.2145 -0.2895*** -0.0691 -0.0946
Selfwork 0.0669 -0.0471 0.1835 -0.0183 0.0860
Retired 0.1438 0.8352* 0.3069 -0.4479*** 0.1648
Houswife 0.0477 0.0994 0.0458 -0.0138 0.0302
Exempt -0.1243 -0.2964*** -0.3441*** 0.3375 -0.1292
_cons 4.0490* 1.7260** 3.3745* 5.4275* 4.1766*
No of observations 1308 245 553 510 1308
R2 0.0149 0.1334 0.033 0.083 0.0277
Ramsey Reset test F(3,1287)=3.82 F(3,226)=0.27 F(3,534)=0.75 F(3,491)=2.77 F(3,1283)=2.85
Prob>F=0.0097 Prob>F=0.8443 Prob>F=0.5238 Prob>F=0.0412 Prob>F=0.0363
Mean VIF 2.18 2.04 2.21 2.34 3.65
Notes: *, **, and *** stand for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Estimations are robust.38
Table 8: LOS regressed on whether or not an unofficial payment was made.
Pooled Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3
Binary Pay Binary Pay Binary Pay Binary Pay
LOS Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(lnlos)
Hospital 3 (Trauma) 0.6828*
Hospital 2 0.1798*
Rg1 -0.0449 0.0386 -0.0347 -1.0097*
Rg3 0.1911* 0.1917* 0.1968* 0.1464**
Rg4 0.2702* 0.2870* 0.4255* 0.0525
Age 0.0019 0.0016 0.0058* -0.0016
Male 0.0707** 0.1372* 0.0406 0.0198
Lnincome -0.0623* 0.0165 -0.0706* -0.0742
Pay_1 0.1333* -0.0424 0.0023 0.3267*
Pay_2 0.2690* 0.3504* 0.1472* 0.3385*
Student -0.0814 0.0064 -0.0313 -0.2157***
Unemploy 0.0147 0.0824 -0.0118 0.0195
Privwork -0.0523 -0.0226 -0.0140 -0.0992
Selfwork -0.0137 0.2283 0.0100 -0.1488
Retired 0.0615 0.2054 0.0209 -0.0073
Houswife 0.1028** 0.0832 0.0043 0.0826
Exempt 0.0134 -0.0125 -0.1034 0.1776
_cons 2.5066* 1.6664* 2.7366* 3.4584*
No of observations 1482 290 600 592
R2 0.3463 0.2393 0.2317 0.107
Ramsey Reset test F(3,1461)=2.2 F(3,271)=1.66 F(3,5811)=4.65 F(3,573)=6.47
Prob>F=0.0861 Prob>F=0.1763 Prob>F=0.0032 Prob>F=0.0003
Mean VIF 2.15 2.05 2.21 2.25
Notes: *, **, and *** stand for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Estimations are robust.39
Table 9: LOS regressed on amount of payment (continuous).
Pooled Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Pooled
Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay
Interactions
LOS Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Hospital 3 (Trauma) 0.6653* 0.5586*
Hospital 2 0.1692* 0.3188*
Rg1 -0.0419 0.0524 -0.0363 -0.9668* -0.0404
Rg3 0.1834* 0.1936* 0.1925* 0.1586** 0.1775*
Rg4 0.2575* 0.2827* 0.4024* 0.0670 0.2714*
Age 0.0027*** 0.0020 0.0054* 0.0000 0.0025***
Male 0.0666** 0.1424* 0.0473 -0.0018 0.0547***
Lnincome -0.0740* 0.0013 -0.0755* -0.0869*** -0.0653*
Lnpayment1 0.0199* 0.0029 0.0001 0.0503* 0.0103***
Hosp2*lnpayment1 -0.0095
Hosp3*lnpayment1 0.0383*
Lnpayment2 0.0418* 0.0496* 0.0198* 0.0599* 0.0554*
Hosp2*lnpayment2 -0.0342*
Hosp3*lnpayment2 0.0009
Student -0.0879*** -0.0072 -0.0470 -0.2359*** -0.1009**
Unemploy -0.0084 0.0806 -0.0371 -0.0133 -0.0063
Privwork -0.0614 -0.0300 -0.0447 -0.0965 -0.0639
Selfwork -0.0307 0.2072*** -0.0009 -0.1684 -0.0167
Retired 0.0563 0.1664 0.0079 0.0009 0.0544
Houswife 0.0938*** 0.0697 -0.0016 0.0750 0.0672
Exempt 0.0045 0.0163 -0.0957 0.1549 0.0234
_cons 2.5307* 1.7258* 2.7887* 3.3650* 2.4472*
No of observations 1424 282 586 556 1424
R2 0.49938 0.255 0.2297 0.1307 0.3688
Ramsey Reset test F(3,1403)=0.71 F(3,263)=1.03 F(3,567)=5.05 F(3,537)=1.46 F(3,1399)=1.92
Prob>F=0.5431 Prob>F=0.3784 Prob>F=0.0019 Prob>F=0.2240 Prob>F=0.1251
Mean VIF 2.18 2.08 2.21 2.32 3.61
Notes: *, **, and *** stand for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Estimations are robust.40
Table 9A: LOS regressed on (continuous) payment taking into account the potential endogeneity of the
payment in the ward (lnpayment2).
Pooled Hospital 3
Continuous pay Continuous Pay
LOS Coef Coef.
Lnpayment2 0.2020* 0.2758*


















Instruments: rg1-rg4, age, male, lnincome, lnc21, occupation, exemption, university, type of referral, surgery.41
Table 10A: Perceived quality (1=not good, 2=satisfactory, 3=good and 4=very good) regressed on
amount paid as informal payments
Pooled Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Pooled
Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay
Interactions
Perceived quality Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Hospital 3 (Trauma) 0.2063** 0.1450
Hospital 2 -0.0464 -0.1341
Rg1 0.1578 -0.1579 0.1883 8.8740* 0.1569
Rg3 0.0304 -0.3045*** 0.1218 0.0756 0.0303
Rg4 -0.1811 -0.6061* -0.0356 0.0890 -0.1747
Age -0.0020 0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0068 -0.0020
Male -0.1163*** -0.0236 -0.1993*** -0.0640 -0.1108***
Lnincome 0.1883* 0.0665 0.3463* 0.0936 0.1890*
Lnpaymet1 -0.0172** -0.0260 -0.0143 -0.0269*** -0.0353***
Hosp2*lnpayment1 0.0252
Hosp3*lnpayment1 0.0153
Lnpayment2 -0.0044 -0.0023 -0.0127 0.0020 -0.0101
Hosp2*lnpayment2 0.0051
Hosp3*lnpayment2 0.0103
Student 0.0433 0.1254 0.1148 -0.2375 0.0486
Unemploy 0.0298 -0.0367 0.1590 -0.0416 0.0369
Privwork -0.0316 -0.1969 -0.0122 0.0750 -0.0260
Selfwork 0.4824* 0.2476 0.6671* 0.3040 0.4808*
Retired 0.3870** 0.0758 0.4747 0.5037 0.3999**
Houswife -0.0820 -0.4519 -0.1838 0.1744 -0.0721
Exempt -0.3031*** 0.0394 -0.3319 -0.4134 -0.3076***
Cut 1 0.2637 -1.1426 2.0163 -1.1032 0.2200
Cut 2 1.1786 -0.1002 2.8977 -0.1709 1.1350
Cut 3 2.8595 1.6426 4.4575 1.6540 2.8169
Prob(y=1|x) 0.0781 0.0709 0.109 0.0496 0.0781
Prob(y=2|x) 0.2197 0.2482 0.2419 0.1823 0.2197
Prob(y=3|x) 0.5690 0.5674 0.5179 0.6230 0.5690
Prob(y=4|x) 0.1332 0.1135 0.1312 0.1451 0.1332
No Observations 1434 282 587 565 1434
Pseudo R2 0.0183 0.0293 0.0273 0.0158 0.0187

























Notes: *, **, and *** stand for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Estimations are robust.42
Table 10B: Perceived quality (1=not good, 2=satisfactory, 3=good and 4=very good) regressed on
amount paid as informal payments controlling for endogeneity of payment2
Pooled Hospital 1 Hospital 2 Hospital 3 Pooled
Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay Continuous Pay
Interactions
Perceived quality Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Hospital 3 (Trauma) 0.1487*** 0.1814
Hospital 2 -0.1770** -0.6362**
Rg1 0.2396*** -0.0574 0.3035** 9.4633* 0.2689**
Rg3 0.0510 -0.2563 0.0784 0.0906 0.0615
Rg4 -0.1919 -0.5859* -0.4058** 0.1166 -0.1796
Age 0.0000 -0.0017 0.0057 -0.0064 0.0000
Male -0.1314** 0.0415 -0.1674 -0.0730 -0.1162***
Lnincome -0.0021 -0.1927 -0.0872 0.0663 -0.0244
Lnpayment1 0.0208 0.0187 0.0786* -0.0228 0.0026
Hosp2*lnpayment1 0.0437**
Hosp3*lnpayment1 0.0078
Lnpayment2 0.2087* 0.2713* 0.3947* 0.0413 0.1968*
Hosp2*lnpayment2 0.1136
Hosp3*lnpayment2 -0.0198
Student 0.1340 -0.2521 0.5132** -0.2129 0.1276
Unemploy 0.1160 -0.1132 0.3902** -0.0145 0.1282
Privwork 0.0882 -0.2684 0.4323** 0.0915 0.1101
Selfwork 0.2590 -0.3842 0.4109 0.2617 0.1976
Retired 0.5872* 0.3245 0.9145* 0.5477*** 0.6022*
Houswife -0.0109 -0.3295 0.1050 0.1628 0.0173
Exempt -0.2872*** 0.0570 -0.3413 -0.4151 -0.2834***
Cut 1 -0.8011 -3.0157 -0.1988 -1.2168 -1.0709
Cut 2 0.1152 -1.9502 0.6901 -0.2815 -0.1517
Cut 3 1.8073 -0.1770 2.2672 1.5480 1.5439
Prob(y=1|x) 0.0784 0.0709 0.11 0.0492 0.0784
Prob(y=2|x) 0.2191 0.2482 0.2403 0.1828 0.2191
Prob(y=3|x) 0.5693 0.5674 0.5178 0.6239 0.5693
Prob(y=4|x) 0.1331 0.1135 0.1320 0.1441 0.1331
No of observations 1442 282 591 569 1442
Pseudo R2 0.0227 0.0435 0.0368 0.0160 0.0247

























Notes: *, **, and *** stand for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Estimations are
robust.Table 11: Marginal effects for the five different probabilities
Mean values of variables Baseline (all dummies = 0) Attributing 1 or 0 to a dummy if mean closer 
to 1 or 0 or more representative group
X dF(y=1)/dx dF(y=2)/dx dF(y=3)/dx dF(y=4)/dx X dF(y=1)/dx dF(y=2)/dx dF(y=3)/dx dF(y=4)/dx X dF(y=1)/dx dF(y=2)/dx dF(y=3)/dx dF(y=4)/dx
Hospital 3 (trauma) 0.395 -0.0236 -0.0376 0.0225 0.0388 0 -0.0284 -0.0370 0.0322 0.0333 1 -0.0237 -0.0376 0.0227 0.0386
Hospital 2 0.410 0.0827 0.1320 -0.0788 -0.1359 0 0.0996 0.1299 -0.1129 -0.1166 0 0.0831 0.1320 -0.0796 -0.1355
Rg1 0.072 -0.0350 -0.0558 0.0333 0.0575 0 -0.0421 -0.0549 0.0477 0.0493 0 -0.0351 -0.0558 0.0337 0.0573
Rg3 0.513 -0.0080 -0.0128 0.0076 0.0131 0 -0.0096 -0.0126 0.0109 0.0113 1 -0.0080 -0.0128 0.0077 0.0131
Rg4 0.074 0.0234 0.0373 -0.0222 -0.0384 0 0.0281 0.0367 -0.0319 -0.0329 0 0.0235 0.0373 -0.0225 -0.0383
Age 43.244 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 43.244 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 43.244 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Male 0.502 0.0151 0.0241 -0.0144 -0.0248 0 0.0182 0.0237 -0.0206 -0.0213 1 0.0152 0.0241 -0.0145 -0.0248
Lnincome 9.719 0.0032 0.0051 -0.0030 -0.0052 9.719 0.0038 0.0050 -0.0043 -0.0045 9.719 0.0032 0.0051 -0.0031 -0.0052
Lnpayment1 3.410 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0006 3.410 -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 3.410 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0006
Lnpayment2 2.556 -0.0271 -0.0433 0.0259 0.0446 2.556 -0.0327 -0.0426 0.0370 0.0383 2.556 -0.0273 -0.0433 0.0261 0.0445
Hosp2*lnpayment1 1.749 -0.0057 -0.0091 0.0054 0.0093 0 -0.0068 -0.0089 0.0078 0.0080 0 -0.0057 -0.0091 0.0055 0.0093
Hosp3*lnpayment1 1.177 -0.0010 -0.0016 0.0010 0.0017 0 -0.0012 -0.0016 0.0014 0.0014 1.177 -0.0010 -0.0016 0.0010 0.0017
Hosp2*lnpayment2 1.118 -0.0148 -0.0236 0.0141 0.0243 0 -0.0178 -0.0232 0.0202 0.0208 0 -0.0148 -0.0236 0.0142 0.0242
Hosp3*lnpayment2 0.965 0.0026 0.0041 -0.0024 -0.0042 0 0.0031 0.0040 -0.0035 -0.0036 0.965 0.0026 0.0041 -0.0025 -0.0042
Student 0.129 -0.0166 -0.0265 0.0158 0.0273 0 -0.0200 -0.0260 0.0226 0.0234 0 -0.0167 -0.0265 0.0160 0.0272
Unemploy 0.182 -0.0167 -0.0266 0.0159 0.0274 0 -0.0201 -0.0262 0.0227 0.0235 0 -0.0167 -0.0266 0.0160 0.0273
Privwork 0.114 -0.0143 -0.0229 0.0136 0.0235 0 -0.0172 -0.0225 0.0195 0.0202 0 -0.0144 -0.0229 0.0138 0.0235
Selfwork 0.037 -0.0257 -0.0410 0.0245 0.0422 0 -0.0309 -0.0404 0.0351 0.0362 0 -0.0258 -0.0410 0.0247 0.0421
Retired 0.260 -0.0783 -0.1250 0.0746 0.1287 0 -0.0943 -0.1230 0.1068 0.1104 1 -0.0787 -0.1250 0.0754 0.1283
Houswife 0.103 -0.0022 -0.0036 0.0021 0.0037 0 -0.0027 -0.0035 0.0031 0.0032 0 -0.0023 -0.0036 0.0022 0.0037
Exempt 0.291 0.0368 0.0588 -0.0351 -0.0606 0 0.0444 0.0579 -0.0503 -0.0520 0 0.0370 0.0588 -0.0355 -0.0604Table 12: Marginal effects of payment variables for various cases
HOSPITAL 1  dF(y=1)/dx dF(y=2)/dx dF(y=3)/dx dF(y=4)/dx
if male  lnpayment1  -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0004
lnpayment2 -0.0376 -0.0410 0.0452 0.0333
if female lnpayment1  -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0005
lnpayment2 -0.0322 -0.0427 0.0362 0.0387
if RG1 lnpayment1  -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0006
lnpayment2 -0.0215 -0.0424 0.0118 0.0521
if RG3 lnpayment1  -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0005
lnpayment2 -0.0296 -0.0432 0.0310 0.0417
if RG4 lnpayment1  -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0004
lnpayment2 -0.0406 -0.0395 0.0496 0.0305
if privworker lnpayment1  -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0005
lnpayment2 -0.0275 -0.0433 0.0267 0.0441
if unemploy lnpayment1  -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0006
lnpayment2 -0.0268 -0.0433 0.0251 0.0450
if retired lnpayment1  -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0008
lnpayment2 -0.0117 -0.0357 -0.0206 0.0681
if exempt lnpayment1  -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0003
lnpayment2 -0.0458 -0.0362 0.0558 0.0262
HOSPITAL 2 dF(y=1)/dx dF(y=2)/dx dF(y=3)/dx dF(y=4)/dx
if male  lnpayment1  -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0002
lnpayment2 -0.0591 -0.0239 0.0660 0.0169
if female lnpayment1  -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0008 0.0003
lnpayment2 -0.0533 -0.0300 0.0626 0.0207
if RG1 lnpayment1  -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0004
lnpayment2 -0.0399 -0.0399 0.0485 0.0312
if RG3 lnpayment1  -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0003
lnpayment2 -0.0502 -0.0328 0.0601 0.0228
if RG4 lnpayment1  -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0008 0.0002
lnpayment2 -0.0621 -0.0202 0.0672 0.0151
if privworker lnpayment1  -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0003
lnpayment2 -0.0477 -0.0348 0.0578 0.0247
if unemploy lnpayment1  -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0003
lnpayment2 -0.0468 -0.0355 0.0569 0.0254
if retired lnpayment1  -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0006
lnpayment2 -0.0252 -0.0432 0.0213 0.0471
if exempt lnpayment1  -0.0008 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0002
lnpayment2 -0.0669 -0.0137 0.0682 0.0124
HOSPITAL 3 dF(y=1)/dx dF(y=2)/dx dF(y=3)/dx dF(y=4)/dx
if male  lnpayment1  -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0005
lnpayment2 -0.0298 -0.0431 0.0316 0.0414
if female lnpayment1  -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0006
lnpayment2 -0.0251 -0.0432 0.0211 0.0472
if RG1 lnpayment1  -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0008
lnpayment2 -0.0159 -0.0396 -0.0050 0.0606
if RG3 lnpayment1  -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0006
lnpayment2 -0.0228 -0.0428 0.0153 0.0503
if RG4 lnpayment1  -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
lnpayment2 -0.0326 -0.0426 0.0369 0.0384
if privworker lnpayment1  -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0007
lnpayment2 -0.0210 -0.0423 0.0106 0.0528
if unemploy lnpayment1  -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0007
lnpayment2 -0.0204 -0.0421 0.0088 0.0537
if retired lnpayment1  -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0009
lnpayment2 -0.0082 -0.0307 -0.0358 0.0748
if exempt lnpayment1  -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0004
lnpayment2 -0.0374 -0.0410 0.0449 0.0335